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Sen,,icee of Mead Data Central, Ina F! PAGE ZZ t 199f U.S. App. LEXIS 30233, *54 tFte attorne}rs, and the History of this caset. ],'° Hendler Ii at 317 but this . conclusion is based an an erroneaus aver-emphasis an the importance of economic valuation in takings jurisprudence, and little else. We do not condone; the ` plaintiffs ' unseemly delay i.h responding to the January 1987 order, but'. the I �.diSMiSsal was not based on their failure to submit a time t response, rather St 'was based on the alleged inadequacy of the response. Had the case not gone off; on the wrong footing the controversy over the ,discovery orders wou3d never,) have arisen. This was not entirely the fudge's doinq. the Government at trial and in its brief nd in, erqu�►ent before this ;court showed a remarkable ; nibility to comprehend the fundamental difference i ;between a takings clat.m bases on a regulatory 'taking theory and one teased an ;1physical. occupation. For example, the Government's brief 1*553 on appeal.,: "Stith counsel for the UhitedIlStaies and the Claims Court believed that the facts c.: requested were essential to the plaintiffs ' claims, and therefore to the governmenVs defense." Appellee 's Brief at 17. But given the factual stipulation p44, the recd rd:'before the court establishing the nature and extent of the 6,0vernlltent's. physical. actiyities on the land, at best an arguable defense might , hake been that these years of physical invasion were somehW I tes�porary,:' bane of: the: disputed intet'rogatories spoke to that questiO even. assuming it was. M9 tiMate4 before. the court.. In Ingalls Shi.pbuil,dinq, Inc.; v. U S., 857 F.Zd 1448 (Fedi: Cir. 19$81�y this ;court reversetl a similar Rule 37 dismissal. T:he government had provided only tht lost general,ited responses to a contractor's interrdgatories seekinq the particulars of a fraud claim'! The court supported its holding in pant with the. trial tourt;.'s'.=failure to give plaintiffs ample notice of its intent to dismiss. tthe case, whereas here, the plaintiffs had a clear warn ;the trial ;ode`s intent. tonetheless, what was said there holds true here: is ,we see it f eo:, the. court 'imeted out a sanction tantamount to dismissal. kT*W not .Gecause of any :willful failure to 'answer L ttari's irate:rrogatori:es.. butbecause of the government's continued ;pursuit of a case the court felt had. no merit.. discovery sanctions, however, are meant to deter in:tentiona abuse cif : the dis ave:ry ,proce.ssf. not as .a means to resolve the me.rlts Of a case. :Where the : problem is 8 perceived inadequacy of proof, no't the failure to provide i't, dismissal, as a sanction under Rule 37 is not warranted :icitati©ns omitted) Ingalls Sh Vbuild'fng Inc. v:, 0nited States, 857 F.Zd at. 1451 . As we stated above in setting out our standard of review,., :we may reYerse a trial court's stole 37 dismissal. as. an abuse of discretion when that dismissal. is. based, amon_q dtherl things, upbn an erroneous conclusion of law:. Our examinat.inn: of the record before us leaves us with a firm conviction that: this has :occurred. in at least titre"e watt. n14 'I _ _Fdotnotes_ _ _ _ _ _ .. _ _ _ _ - -- _ ! _ _ _. n14 See Western Elec. Inc.1':v. Pi'ezo Technology, Inc., 860 F.?:d at 431° (tri;al court erred in interpretinq a: Supreme Court case which permitted the Secretary of ;Agri:cul ture to be deposed, ordering the deposit>ion bf a patent examiner was an abuse of discretion) - _ - -- .. _End Footnotes- it X7 1