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Thatcher Company.-Stockton <br /> Inspection Date:07/25/2019 <br /> ILA—FIELD OBSERVATIONS <br /> The EPA inspector conducted a walkthrough of the chlorine process,the sulfur dioxide storage <br /> area, and the warehouse. <br /> • Field walkdown of P&ID for chlorine railcar spot#9 <br /> • 7 chlorine railcars onsite at the time of the inspection with the capacity for 10 railcars <br /> • Observed hoses at the chlorine filling stations <br /> • Observed gas sensors and placement/location of sensors <br /> • Observed corrosion and paint coating failure on chlorine lines in the Powell Room <br /> • Observed chlorine scrubber and activation switch <br /> • 4 SCBAS and masks in warehouse area <br /> ILB —DOCUMENTATION REVIEW <br /> Hazard Assessment 40 CFR §§ 68.20-42 <br /> The RMP submission includes a worst case scenario(WCS) and alternate release scenario (ARS) <br /> offsite consequence analysis (OCA) for both sulfur dioxide and chlorine.Thatcher used the <br /> Hazard Prediction and Analysis Capability (HPAC) Model Scenarios from the Chlorine Institute <br /> Pamphlet 74, Edition 6, to perform the WCS and ARS OCA modeling for chlorine. On <br /> September 12, 2017, the Chlorine Institute (CI) suspended publication of Pamphlet 74 pending a <br /> completed review of the results from the Jack Rabbit II field testing and modeling work, <br /> performed by the Department of Homeland Security Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) <br /> under contract to the Chlorine Institute. <br /> Thatcher provided a revised draft WCS for chlorine but had not officially submitted the WCS at <br /> the time of the EPA inspection. In this revised RMP submission, Thatcher used RMPComp* <br /> instead of the suspended Cl Pamphlet 74. <br /> Process Safety Information 40 CFR § 68.65 <br /> The EPA inspector conducted a walkdown of the P&ID including chlorine railcar spot#9. The <br /> EPA inspector observed the manufacture date printed on the hoses associated with the chlorine_ <br /> fill stations to be 3/28/19. <br /> Process Hazard Analysis 40 CFR § 68.67 <br /> The EPA inspector requested the most recent PHA, including recommendations and tracking, as <br /> a follow-up to the inspection. <br /> Operating Procedures 40 CFR § 68.69 <br /> The EPA inspector reviewed the emergency shutdown procedures for the chlorine system. <br /> Written procedures provided at the time of the EPA inspection did not mention manual activation <br /> of the chlorine scrubber system or the switch panel to activate the actuators, which can cut <br /> 4 <br />