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114 Part i california Water Some of the same coordination challenges found at the local level occur at the state and federal levels as well. For example, through an accident of history, two different federal agencies, housed in separate cabinet departments, administer the Endangered Species Act for different fish that live within the same inland water systems. Through another accident of history, the federal government owns and operates the Central Valley Project, which shares the Delta as a conveyance hub and runs parallel to the state-run State Water Project for much of its length (Chapter 1). Although USBR and DWR work together on operations under a Coordinated Operating Agreement, differences in CVP and SWP rules and dis- tinct water rights have complicated water transfers between users on either side of this administrative line. Coordination is also necessary, and often difficult, between the state and federal agencies that operate water supply infrastructure and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in charge of flood control operations in most reservoirs. Coordination gaps among these and other agencies operating in complex systems, such as the Delta, were one of the impetuses behind the CALFED process in the mid-1990s, which formed numerous interagency work- ing groups (Chapter 1; Little Hoover Commission 2005). The Delta Stewardship Council, created under the 2009 legislative package, is another attempt to resolve coordination problems, this time by centralizing some planning functions at the level of a seven-member appointed council. As discussed below, lack of coordina- tion poses particular problems in the conduct of science to support policymaking. Agencies are often constrained in exercising their authority by staff and fund- ing limitations, which frequently reflect political opposition to action. This has been a particular challenge for state agencies. For instance, water rights admin- istration by the State Water Resources Control Board has been hamstrung by low levels of staffing, resulting in multidecade backlogs in processing water rights applications in such areas as the Russian River (Little Hoover Commission 2010). In the past, the board also has been criticized for failing to exercise its wide latitude to place restrictions on the exercise of water rights for the benefit of the public interest.43 The Department of Fish and Game, which has broad authority to regulate dams and water diversions to protect aquatic species under the Fish and Game Code, faces even greater challenges related to staffing, resources, and lack 43. In 1986, for example, the California Court of Appeal criticized the State Water Resources Control Board’s failure to more aggressively address water quality issues in the Delta. According to the court, the board overlooked its “statutory commitment to establish objectives assuring the ‘reasonable protection of beneficial uses,’” which “grants the Board broad discretion to establish reasonable standards consistent with overall statewide standards” (United States v. State Water Resources Control Board [Racanelli] 1986). More generally, see Hundley (2001).