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1 carrying out its statutory duties . <br /> 2 The court first held that the Attorney General and the <br /> 3 Department of Health Services had standing to bring an action <br /> 4 seeking to set aside the judgment. The court then held that the <br /> 5 district attorney had no authority to bind a state agency and to <br /> 6 restrict that agency from performing its statutory duties . (Id. <br /> 7 at p. 752 . ) <br /> 8 "So in this case, the judge and all concerned <br /> are charged with notice that the Department <br /> 9 was authorized and directed by law to control <br /> the operation and licensing of [Hy-Lond' s] <br /> 10 skilled nursing facilities (citations <br /> omitted) , and that there was no power in the <br /> 11 court to restrain the exercise of that power <br /> on the stipulation of the district attorney. " <br /> 12 <br /> 13 (Id. at p. 753 . ) <br /> 14 The statutory provision authorizing suit by a district <br /> 15 attorney in Hy-Lond provided that the district attorney shall <br /> 16 bring an action, upon application by the state department, to <br /> 17 prosecute a violation of Health and Safety Code sections 1250- <br /> 18 1339 . 27 . ( Id. at p. 746 . ) This is much stronger language than <br /> 19 that involved in this case where the statute provides that the <br /> 20 action can be brought by the district attorney, city attorney or <br /> 21 the Attorney General . In Hy-Lond, the agency ultimately <br /> 22 determined not to be bound by the judgement was the agency which <br /> 23 initiated the legal process by requesting the action to be filed. <br /> 24 Here, the agency purported to be bound (the Board ) was not even <br /> 25 aware that an action was being brought which purported to effect <br /> 26 its ability to perform its statutory duties . Clearly, if the <br /> 27 action of the district attorney did not bind the state agency in <br /> 7 . <br />