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Karen Kaika August 7, 1996 Page 5 In sum, the burden is on Royal to locate evidence that the release was not an accident. Otherwise, Royal may assume, based on the documentary evidence before it, that there was an unexpected and unintended release which can be construed as an accident under the policies. As to property damage and the first party coverage issue, we are continuing to define what property damage occurred to the buildings, the tanks and other potentially covered equipment as a result of the contamination. Nevertheless, as this correspondence concludes, there is coverage as to a third party claim which triggers Royal's and Continental's duty to defend. The "Sudden and Accidental" Pollution Exclusion We are all well aware that ever since its addition to the standard GCL policy language in 1973, the pollution exclusion has been the source of controversy, litigation and inconsistent judicial interpretation around the country. In particular, the word "sudden" has been tortured in innumerable opinions. It is our position that the pollution exclusion does not apply in this instance to preclude coverage For the following reasons: 1) extrinsic evidence of Royal's drafting history of the exclusion is admissible to show the scope of the exclusion intended when Royal sought approval to insert the exclusion in the standardized GCL form. Where courts have considered the drafting history of the pollution exclusion, policyholders have generally prevailed and the courts have construed "sudden and accidental". to mean unexpected and unintended. E.g., Just v. Land Reclamation. Ltd. (Wis.1990) 155 Wis.2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570; Morton Int'l. Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. (N.J.1993) 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831; Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (Ga.1989) 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686, 689; Joy Technologies v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (W.Va.1992) 187 W.Va. 742, 421 S.E.2d 493, 500; and 2) The doctrine of concurrent causation applies where the damage results from two concurrent causes. First, the California Supreme Court held in Montrose Chemical Cote. v. Admiral Ins. Co. (1995) 10 CalAth 645, that the drafting history of the standardized GCL policy and other similar extrinsic evidence is relevant and admissible to construe standard form policy language. Id. at pp. 670-671. The Court also cited with approval other California appellate court cases which considered drafting history to determine coverage issues. Id., citing e.g.; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Reeder (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 961, 968; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1621, 1629; American Star Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of the West (1991) 232