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114 Part I California Water <br /> Some of the same coordination challenges found at the local level occur at the <br /> state and federal levels as well.For example,through an accident of history,two <br /> different federal agencies, housed in separate cabinet departments, administer <br /> the Endangered Species Act for different fish that live within the same inland <br /> water systems.Through another accident of history,the federal government owns <br /> and operates the Central Valley Project,which shares the Delta as a conveyance <br /> hub and runs parallel to the state-run State Water Project for much of its length <br /> (Chapter 1). Although USBR and DWR work together on operations under a <br /> Coordinated Operating Agreement,differences in CVP and SWP rules and dis- <br /> tinct water rights have complicated water transfers between users on either side <br /> of this administrative line. Coordination is also necessary, and often difficult, <br /> between the state and federal agencies that operate water supply infrastructure <br /> and the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers,in charge of flood control operations in <br /> most reservoirs. Coordination gaps among these and other agencies operating <br /> in complex systems, such as the Delta, were one of the impetuses behind the <br /> CALFED process in the mid-1990s,which formed numerous interagency work- <br /> ing groups(Chapter 1;Little Hoover Commission 2005).The Delta Stewardship <br /> Council,created under the 2009 legislative package,is another attempt to resolve <br /> coordination problems,this time by centralizing some planning functions at the <br /> level of a seven-member appointed council.As discussed below,lack of coordina- <br /> tion poses particular problems in the conduct of science to support policymaking. <br /> Agencies are often constrained in exercising their authority by staff and fund- <br /> ing limitations,which frequently reflect political opposition to action.This has <br /> been a particular challenge for state agencies.For instance,water rights admin- <br /> istration by the State Water Resources Control Board has been hamstrung by low <br /> levels of staffing, resulting in multidecade backlogs in processing water rights <br /> applications in such areas as the Russian River(Little Hoover Commission 2010). <br /> In the past, the board also has been criticized for failing to exercise its wide <br /> latitude to place restrictions on the exercise of water rights for the benefit of the <br /> public interest 43 The Department of Fish and Game,which has broad authority to <br /> regulate dams and water diversions to protect aquatic species under the Fish and <br /> Game Code,faces even greater challenges related to staffing,resources,and lack <br /> 43. In 1986,for example,the California Court of Appeal criticized the State Water Resources Control Board's failure to <br /> more aggressively address water quality issues in the Delta.According to the court,the board overlooked its"statutory <br /> commitment to establish objectives assuring the`reasonable protection of beneficial uses,"'which"grants the Board <br /> broad discretion to establish reasonable standards consistent with overall statewide standards"(United States v.State <br /> Water Resources Control Board(Racanelli]1986).More generally,see Hundley(2001). <br />